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INTRODUCTION
Under the absolute priority rule of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii), a reorganization plan
that gives a junior class of creditors an interest in the estate will not be confirmed unless each
senior class receives full payment or gives its consent. The absolute priority rule was amended
in 2005 by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (“BAPCPA”) by
adding an exception that allows individual chapter 11 debtors to retain property included in the
estate under newly added section 1115. This amendment furthers the congressional intent of
allowing chapter 11 to function more like chapter 13, under which there is no absolute priority
rule for individual debtors.
Recently, in In re Tegeder, In re Roedemeier, and In re Bullard, bankruptcy courts have
interpreted this amendment as creating an exception to the absolute priority rule for individual
chapter 11 debtors, as retention of pre-petition property and post-petition property and earnings
is now acceptable. The exception to the absolute priority rule has also effected unsecured
creditor protection. The absolute priority rule must be met in order for “cram down,” the
confirmation of a reorganization plan over an impaired class’ rejection of the plan, to occur.
Before the amendment, “cram down” could not occur if an individual debtor retained property.
However, the negotiating ability once offered to unsecured creditors under the absolute priority
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rule has disappeared. Since the BAPCPA amendment, confirmation is permitted when an
individual retains pre-petition property and post-petition property and earnings, even over the
objections of unpaid unsecured creditors. Still, some protection for unsecured creditors may
remain under the chapter 11 disposable income requirement of section 1129(a)(15). Section
1129(a)(15), which mirrors section 1325(b)(2) for chapter 13, requires the value of property
distributed under the plan be no less than the unsecured claim or the commitment of disposable
income over at least five years.

I.
A.

THE ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE AND CHAPTER 11

DEBTORS

The Absolute Priority Rule as Amended by BAPCPA
The absolute priority rule, as amended by BAPCPA, provides that “the holder of any

claim or interest that is junior to the claims of [the class of unsecured creditors] . . . will not
receive or retain . . . any property, except that in a case in which the debtor is an individual, the
debtor may retain property included in the estate under section 1115.” 11 U.S.C. §
1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2006). Section 1115 provides that property of the estate under chapter 11
includes all property under section 541 acquired post-petition, as well as earnings acquired postpetition, “in addition to the property specified in section 541.” See 11 U.S.C. § 1115. Section
541 provides that the estate includes, among other things, “all legal and equitable interests of the
debtor in property as of the commencement of the case,” as well as “any interest in property that
the estate acquires after the commencement of the case.” See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1), (a)(7).
Taken together, the estate therefore includes pre-petition property and post-petition property and
earnings. Prior to BAPCPA, post-petition earnings were not considered part of the estate.
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The 2005 BAPCPA amendment has therefore altered the absolute priority rule, which is
central to the law of reorganization. The rule, which predates the Bankruptcy Code, is the source
of both substantive rights and procedural protections for reorganization participants. See In re
Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 432 F.3d 507, 512 (3d Cir. 2005); Douglas G. Baird, THE
ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 81–82 (Rev. ed., The Foundation Press, Inc. 1993). It was intended
to give unsecured creditors negotiating power. 432 F.3d at 514–15 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-595,
at 416).
The absolute priority rule must be met in order for “cram down” to occur under section
1129(b). “Cram down” is the confirmation of a reorganization plan despite an impaired class’
rejection of the plan. The “cram down” provision of section 1129(b)(1) provides that “the court,
on request of the proponent of the plan, shall confirm the plan notwithstanding the requirements
[of confirmation] . . . if the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable, with
respect to each class of claims or interest that is impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan.”
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1). Therefore, under this provision, a reorganization plan can be confirmed
despite an impaired class’ rejection of the plan, as long as it does not discriminate unfairly, and is
fair and equitable. See In re Tegeder, 369 B.R. 477, 479 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2007); 7 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY, ¶ 1129, at 1129.04 (Alan N. Resnick et al. eds., 15th ed. rev. 2006) (explaining a
confirmation can be “crammed down” throat of dissenting class when requirements of 1129(b)
are met) (quoting New English Coal & Coke Co. v. Rutland R. Co., 143 F.2d 179, 189 (2d Cir.
1944), where phrase first used by court). In order to be fair and equitable, unsecured claims must
be paid in full, or the absolute priority rule must be met. In re Tegeder, 369 B.R. at 479. Prior to
the BAPCPA amendment to the absolute priority rule, an individual debtor was prohibited from
retaining property in order for “cram down” to occur. 369 B.R. at 480.
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As a result of BAPCPA’s 2005 amendment, property and earnings acquired after the
commencement of a case are considered property of the estate. See Donald R. Lassman,
Individual Chapter 11s Really Do Work, 27 AM. BANK. INST. J. 18, 65 (2008). The intent of this
new provision was to waive the absolute priority requirements imposed by section
1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) and permit an individual debtor to retain property and earnings included in the
estate under section 1115. 6 NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC. 3d § § 106:1, 113:21 (2008).
Although not clearly worded, section 1115 clearly includes post-petition property and earnings
as well as pre-petition property that becomes property of the estate under section 541. See In re
Goldstein, 385 B.R. 496, 498–99 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2007). The bankruptcy courts have
interpreted section 1115 to mean that the absolute priority rule no longer applies to individuals
retaining property of the estate under section 1115. Therefore, confirmation of a plan is
permitted when individual debtors retain property and earnings, even over the objections of
unpaid unsecured creditors. See In re Bullard, 358 B.R. 541, 544 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2007); In re
Roedemeier, 374 B.R. 264, 274 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2007); In re Tegeder, 368 B.R. 477, 478 (Bankr.
D. Neb. 2007). Thus, chapter 11 has taken on characteristics of chapter 13, under which the
absolute priority rule does not exist.

B.

BAPCPA Aims to Allow Chapter 11 to Function Like Chapter 13
BAPCPA’s ratification has led to the development of chapter 11 for individual debtors as

a mingling of chapters 11 and 13, with the intention of allowing chapter 11 proceedings to
function like those under chapter 13. Another Court Holds that Absolute Priority Rule Does Not
Apply to Individual Chapter 11 Debtors Post-BAPCPA, http://miamifloridabankruptcylawyer.
wordpress.com (Aug. 25, 2007, 17:53 EST). This is apparent in both the amendment to section
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1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) and the addition of section 1115. The exception to the absolute priority rule for
individual chapter 11 debtors under section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) is drawn from principles of chapter
13, under which there is no absolute priority rule. Furthermore, the definition of property of the
estate provided in section 1115 for chapter 11 filings emulates the definition of property of the
estate provided in section 1306(a) for chapter 13 filings. Id. Since the BAPCPA amendment,
post-petition earnings are property of the chapter 11 estate. Therefore, in expanding the
definition of property, section 1115 treats post-petition earnings under chapters 11 and 13 the
same. Id. In doing so, BAPCPA addresses the concern that although individuals can file under
chapter 11, it is not tailored for them.
A chapter 11 proceeding, although more complex and costly than one under chapter 13,
can provide relief for those individuals deep in debt who cannot file under chapter 13. See
Donald R. Lassman, Individual Chapter 11s Really Do Work, 27 AM. BANK. INST. J. 18, 18
(2008).

Still, although individuals may be required to file chapter 11, most seeking

rehabilitation will file chapter 13. Paul W. Bonapfel, Individual Chapter 11 Cases Under
BAPCPA, 25 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 53, 54 (July, Aug. 2006). Generally, “there are many more
opportunities for creditors to press their agenda in the chapter 11 process,” and therefore it is
necessary to contemplate creditor intervention. Lassman, supra, at 66. However, this may not
be the case in commonly arising disputes regarding payment terms to general unsecured
creditors. Id. at 67. After an initial demonstration of the plan’s conformity with section 1129, a
submission of a creditor voting affidavit, and the availability of witness testimony regarding the
plan’s feasibility, “cram down” is possible under section 1129(b) when more than one class of
creditors is impaired. Id. at 68. The absolute priority rule had given creditors leverage in
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challenging individual chapter 11 debtors’ plans, but it no longer applies to individual debtors
attempting to retain property after plan confirmation. Id.

C.

Recent Interpretations of the BAPCPA Amendment to the Absolute Priority Rule
Those courts having addressed the BAPCPA amendment of the absolute priority rule

have concluded that the absolute priority rule no longer applies to individual chapter 11 debtors.
This interpretation of the amendment is illustrated by the decisions of In re Tegeder, In re
Roedemeier, and In re Bullard. To come to this conclusion, the bankruptcy courts addressed the
interaction of sections 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii), 1115, and 541, as well as the congressional intent
behind BAPCPA. In re Tegeder was the first decision to address the absolute priority rule
amendment.
i. In re Tegeder
The bankruptcy court in In re Tegeder held that the addition of section 1115 to the
Bankruptcy Code by the 2005 BAPCPA amendments created an exception to the absolute
priority rule for individual chapter 11 debtors. 368 B.R. 477, 478 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2007). In
Tegeder, the individual debtors filed a chapter 11 plan, confirmation of which was objected to by
the U.S. Trustee. Id. The plan was accepted by all classes except the general unsecured creditor
class. Id. As the general unsecured creditor class did not accept the proposed chapter 11 plan,
the “cram down” provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) were triggered. Id. at 478, 479. The debtors
retained all of their property, which included both pre-petition and post-petition property and
earnings. Id. at 479. Although all other requirements for plan confirmation under section
1129(a) were met, the U.S. Trustee argued that the debtor, as a holder of interests junior to the
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dissenting class, could not retain any property pursuant to the absolute priority rule of section
1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). Id.
Addressing the effect of the cross-reference to section 1115 in section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii),
the Tegeder court held that the absolute priority rule did not prevent a plan’s confirmation when
both pre- and post-petition assets were retained by an individual debtor. Id. at 478. The court
explained that the 2005 BAPCPA amendment and the addition of section 1115 created an
exception to the rule, allowing an individual debtor to retain property included in the estate. Id.
at 479–80. Section 1115 includes post-petition earnings, as well as property of the estate under
section 541. Id. at 480. This property includes legal and equitable interests held pre-petition, as
well as post-petition property. Id. Thus, the court reasoned that the debtor’s retention of prepetition property and post-petition property and earnings was permitted. Id. at 478. The court
cautioned that the plan must still be fair and equitable. Id. at 480. The plan proposed had not
been objected to on fairness grounds. Id. Therefore, as the plan treated unsecured creditors
equitably, it was confirmed. Id. at 481.
In re Tegeder set forth the proposition that the absolute property rule is inapplicable to
those individual debtors retaining property of estate under section 1115. Id. at 480. The courts
in In re Roedemeier and In re Bullard have reached similar conclusions.
ii. In re Roedemeier
Building on the foundation of In re Tegeder, the bankruptcy court in In re Roedemeier
held that sections 1115 and 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) should be construed broadly to cover property
brought into the estate by both sections 1115(a) and 541, as well as to explain the purpose of the
BAPCPA amendment of the absolute priority rule. 374 B.R. 264, 275−76 (Bankr. D.
Kan. 2007). In Roedemeier, an individual debtor operated a dental practice through a limited
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liability company. Id. at 266. After being pursued for collection of a debt guarantee, the
individual debtor filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition and proposed a simple reorganization
plan. Id. at 266−67. The plan was not objected to, yet the court was required to make certain it
conformed to the confirmation requirements of section 1129. Id. at 270. As section 1129(a)(8)
had not been met, the debtor suggested that the class of unsecured creditors be treated as having
objected to the plan. Id.
The Roedemeier court had to address the absolute priority rule in order to grant the
debtor’s request for “cram down” under section 1129(b) and plan confirmation over the
objections of the impaired general unsecured creditors. Id. at 271. The court found the plan to
be nondiscriminatory, as required by section 1129(b), because the general unsecured creditors
were within a single class and therefore treated uniformly. Id. at 273. In assessing whether the
plan was fair and equitable, the plan had to conform to the absolute priority rule of section
1129(b)(2)(B)(ii), which was amended with the addition of the “except” clause. Id. at 274. The
court reasoned that the addition of section 1115 should be interpreted broadly to cover both prepetition property under section 541 and post-petition property and earnings under section
1115(a). Id. Therefore, the debtor could retain pre-petition property, including ownership of the
limited liability company, despite a class of unsecured creditors not being paid in full. Id. at 276.
The court’s expansive interpretation would not subject an individual chapter 11 debtor to the
absolute priority rule. Id. Furthermore, the court’s interpretation allowed for chapter 11 to
function more like chapter 13 for individual debtors, the underlying purpose of the BAPCPA
amendment of the absolute priority rule. Id. at 275−76. If narrowly interpreted to apply only to
post-petition property under section 1115(a), a debtor’s ability to reorganize under chapter 11
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would be minimally affected. Id. at 275. The court explained that this would not carry out
Congress’ intent in ratifying BAPCPA. Id.
The Roedemeier court held the chapter 11 reorganization plan exempt from the absolute
priority rule and meeting the “cram down” requirements. Id. at 276. Therefore, the plan was
confirmed despite unsecured creditors receiving only three percent distribution on their claims.
Id. To reach such a conclusion, In re Roedemeier relied on a broad construction of the absolute
priority rule exception. Id. at 274.
iii. In re Bullard
The court in In re Bullard similarly held, based on section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii), that a
chapter 11 reorganization plan could be confirmed despite the debtor’s retention of post-petition
property and earnings. 358 B.R. 541, 544 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2007). The individual debtor’s plan,
to which no objections were filed, intended retention of post-petition property and earnings. Id.
at 542−43. As the requirements of section 1129(a) were met, except paragraph eight, the court
addressed whether the debtor could “cram down” the nonaccepting impaired classes. Id. at 543.
The court, deferring to the BAPCPA amendment, explained confirmation would occur only if
section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) was met. Id. In re Bullard acknowledged that the BAPCPA
amendment altered the absolute priority rule, a fundamental principle of reorganization law. Id.
(citing Northwest Bank Worthington v. Alhers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988)). Nevertheless, based on the
absolute priority rule exception, the court concluded that the debtor could retain post-petition
property and earnings under section 1115. Id. at 544.
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II. PROTECTION FOR CREDITORS
A.

The Exception to the Absolute Priority Rule and Its Effect on Creditors
The current interpretation of section 1115, as illustrated by the bankruptcy courts in In re

Tegeder, In re Roedemeier, and In re Bullard, has created an exception to the absolute priority
rule for individual chapter 11 debtors and permitted the retention of pre-petition property and
post-petition property and earnings even over the objections of unpaid unsecured creditors. See
358 B.R. at 544; 374 B.R. at 276; 368 B.R. at 480. Thus, a single phrase added to the end of
section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) by the BAPCPA amendment appears to have eliminated a creditor’s
ability to challenge the reorganization plan of an individual chapter 11 debtor who seeks to retain
property and earnings after confirmation. See Donald R. Lassman, Individual Chapter 11s
Really Do Work, 27 AM. BANK. INST. J. 18, 68 (2008).

B.

Protection for Creditors Under the Disposable Income Requirement
The protection once offered to a creditor in challenging the reorganization plan of a

chapter 11 debtor who seeks to retain property and earnings after plan confirmation appears to
have been replaced by the new disposable income confirmation requirement of section
1129(a)(15). See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(15). This requirement, unlike “cram down,” can only be
invoked by a single unsecured creditor who objects to confirmation. See In re Roedemeier, 374
B.R. at 271; Bonapfel, supra, at 57. Under the disposable income requirement added by
BAPCPA, the property distributed cannot be less than the unsecured claim’s value. Individual
Chapter 11 Cases After BAPCPA: Can You Still Close the Case Early?, http://www.abiworld.org
(Aug. 1, 2006). Otherwise, section 1129(a)(15) requires a projected disposable income
commitment from the debtor for five years or that time provided under the plan, whichever is
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longer. Bonapfel, supra, at 57. The chapter 11 disposable income requirement of section
1129(a)(15) parallels the chapter 13 disposable income requirement of section 1325(b)(2). Id.
Taken together with the absolute priority rule exception, the disposable income requirement was
meant to align plan confirmation under chapter 11 with that under chapter 13. See Lassman,
supra, at 68; Individual Chapter 11 Cases After BAPCPA. However, the congressional intent to
incorporate the chapter 13 concept of disposable income may not have been successful.
Bonapfel, supra, at 57. Although section 1129(a)(15) prohibits the distributed value from being
less than the projected disposable income, it does not require payments to unsecured claim
holders. Id. Still, the disposable income requirement is arguably a success in disciplining the
debtor, post confirmation, in observance of plan terms during their disposable income
commitment. Lassman, supra, at 67.

CONCLUSION
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 amended the
absolute priority rule for individual chapter 11 debtors in order for chapter 11 to function more
like chapter 13. This amendment has been interpreted by the bankruptcy courts in In re Tegeder,
In re Roedemeier, and In re Bullard. Those courts have found that the absolute priority rule no
longer applies individual chapter 11 debtors retaining property of the estate under section 1115.
Therefore, unsecured creditors may have to look to the disposable income requirement of section
1129(a)(15) for protections once offered under section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). These recent
developments are especially of weight as those chapter 11 filings under BAPCPA are likely to
increase throughout the coming year. Michael D. Sousa, Recent Developments in Chapter 11,
NORTON ANN. SURVEY OF BANKR. L. Part III § § 18, 861 (Aug. 2008).
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